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A massive reversal of international capital ﬂows has taken place during the Great Recession: in 2013, cross-border capital
ﬂows were 40% of their 2007 level.1 While the reversal reached an unprecedented magnitude in all broad categories of ﬂows
(Forbes and Warnock, 2012), the sharpest decline in activity was in international bank loans extended cross-border or by
local afﬁliates (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). The retrenchment after 2008 was highly heterogeneous across countries with
emerging countries less severely hit than developed countries (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). While ﬁnancial integration is
often considered as a tenacious long-run trend, this massive retrenchment raises the possibility that it may not be a
monotonic process. Yet, the recent ﬁnancial reversal is barely put in perspective with the ebbs and ﬂows of international
capital. With the beneﬁts of hindsight, can we identify cyclical patterns in ﬁnancial integration over a long span? How do
different areas compare? The major aim of our analysis is to estimate the trends in international banking integration. We
construct a measure of banking integration to quantitatively document the different patterns across different geographical
areas including the stage of their banking integration and the magnitude of recovery when it happened. We ﬁnd that
banking integration of the euro area has been cyclical since 1999 while it has not reversed outside the euro area. The
uncovered dynamics echo the waves in international capital ﬂows described in Forbes and Warnock (2012). Beyond the
speciﬁc crisis events under scrutiny, our ﬁndings hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the ﬁnancial cycle.uvatier), annelaure.delatte@sciencespo.fr (A.-L. Delatte).
alization: Retreat or reset?”, March 2013.
Our measure of banking integration draws on recent contributions in three different aspects. First, the debate about global
imbalances has made it clear that gross positions are important to grasp the degree of ﬁnancial integration (Milesi-Ferretti et
al., 2010; Shin, 2012). This is because net positions can hide massive gross positions.2 In this work, we focus on the asset side of
banks to document the adjustment of their foreign claims across time. Second, understanding the overall structure of foreign
claims positions requires estimates of bilateral positions. In fact, the gravity literature applied to ﬁnancial transactions
emphasizes the inﬂuence of bilateral differences of information and bilateral institutional linkages on the allocation decision of
investors (Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005; Martin and Rey, 2004; Okawa and Van Wincoop, 2012). Third, in order to
compute a measure of banking integration, we draw inspiration from an indirectly related literature on trade openness based
on the idea of a benchmark level calculated from a gravity model (see Wang and Winters, 1992; Hamilton and Winters, 1992;
Nilsson, 2000 for trade in goods and Park, 2002; Guillin, 2013a for trade in services). More precisely, in the trade literature, the
approach consists in estimating gravity models where bilateral transactions are determined by standard gravity factors
(economic size and frictions). Then what is left over in the regression, i.e. what is not related to standard gravity factors, is kept
to compute an openness measure. The larger the positive leftovers, the more open the countries; in turn the negative and large
leftovers are associated with closed countries. Here, similarly, we estimate gravity equations for banking claims including size
and frictions factors. We identify what is not explained by standard gravity factors or white noise to obtain a quantitative
measure that informs us on the current state of banking (dis)integration in different geographical areas.
More speciﬁcally, we use gravity equations initially developed to analyze the determinants of bilateral trade ﬂows, which
have later shown to do a good job ﬁtting bilateral ﬁnancial ﬂows.3 Gravity equations are a model of bilateral interactions in
which “mass” and “resistance” terms enter multiplicatively. Simply put, bilateral ﬁnancial ﬂows rise proportionately with the
economic size of both countries (“mass”) and are negatively correlated with frictions mentioned before, including information
asymmetry proxied by physical distance as well as different language, currency and legal system (“resistance”). This approach
has two main advantages. First, the model is based on bilateral data at the country level, meaning that we have granular data
on source and destination of funds to draw an accurate picture of international banking activities. Second, it controls for
frictions as well as time-varying factors that affect banking activity. For example, when an economy is hit by a severe ﬁnancial
crisis and falls in recession, the size of its economy decreases and its international banking activities adjust downward. This
size effect should however not be considered as a disintegration of banking sectors. We include trends in the estimated
speciﬁcations to capture the changes in the banking integration and we allow the trends to be nonlinear to account for
reversals across time. A spline function (i.e., a smooth polynomial function that is piece-wise-deﬁned) is used to allow a
maximum of ﬂexibility but we show that our ﬁndings are robust to alternative non-linear functional forms. We run our
estimates on 14 countries (vis-à-vis around 186 partner countries) including 7 euro area members over the period 1999–2012.
We estimate the empirical model with ﬁxed effects and Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimators. The latter has two advantages
of identifying the effect of time invariant bilateral characteristics and providing more efﬁcient estimates.
Our estimates uncover new stylized facts. We ﬁnd that the decline in banking activities observed after the crisis was due
to temporary frictions in all countries outside the euro area. The international banking integration has never declined and on
the contrary has even strengthened with a level of banking activities, in 2012, 37% higher than what the gravity model
would predict. In contrast, the economic downturn faced by the euro area since 2008 is not sufﬁcient to account for the
massive retrenchment of euro area banks from international activities. Depending on the destination geographic area, we
assess that in 2012 the exposure of euro area banks was between 37% and 33% below what gravity factors would predict.
Last, international banking activity in the euro area has been cyclical since 1999 with a peak in 2006 and we ﬁnd a larger
amplitude of the cycle in stressed countries than core countries.
This work is related with the recent papers documenting the massive retrenchment of international ﬁnancial ﬂows during the
crisis (Forbes andWarnock, 2012; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012). Unlike most of these papers which
investigate aggregate ﬂows, our paper relies on bilateral positions. Some recent papers estimate bilateral dynamics too, including
(Galstyan and Lane, 2013; Gourinchas et al., 2012) for portfolio data and (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013) for foreign bank loans. All
these papers focus on the shifts that took place during the great recession to explain their drivers (geographic distance and other
information-sensitive factors) or measure the wealth transfers across regions. And they treat all advanced countries similarly
because they cover an estimation period before the euro area ﬁnancial fragmentation became visible in the data. Relatively to these
papers, our longer period of estimation allows us to document the full adjustment of bank activities and emphasize that there was
no such thing as banking disintegration outside the euro area in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Our work also complements papers examining cross-border integration among the euro area countries. On the one hand,
during the ﬁrst decade of the single currency, papers have documented unambiguous positive effects of euro on cross-
border ﬁnancial integration (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010; Lane, 2006; Coeurdacier and Martin, 2009).4 Here, we show that the
level of integration has changed over time and that integration can actually revert. On the other hand, by putting euro area
in perspective with the rest of the world, we complement the recent works that have documented the banking2 For example, from the end of the nineties, European banks have been net lenders to the US corporate sector and a net recipient of inter-bank and
deposits from the US at the same time. As a consequence, the European external position towards the US was balanced, contrary to emerging surplus
countries, implying that the growing role of European banks in inter-mediating US savings has been overlooked by regulators (McGuire and Von Peter,
2009; Baba et al., 2009).
3 See Head and Mayer (2013) for a literature review of gravity models.
4 See Papaioannou (2009) for a literature review.
fragmentation inside the European Monetary Union since the onset of the crisis (ECB, 2014; Brutti and Sauré, 2014; Bologna
and Caccavaio, 2014). Overall our results raise the question of a transfer of international banking activities from the euro
area to the non euro area countries. It is beyond the scope of our database to investigate the drivers of this isolation and we
discuss possible further investigation at the end of the paper.
The next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 provides a ﬁrst picture of the evolution of international banking
activities based on descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we present our empirical strategy which draws on gravity equations.
Estimation results are presented in Section 5 which also provides a graphical analysis of our banking (des)integration
measure. Section 6 summarizes our ﬁndings and concludes.2. Related literature
Financial integration has been described as a tenacious long-run trend since the end of the Bretton Woods monetary
system. Only recently, the possibility that it may not be a monotonic process has run through the literature on international
capital markets. Initially, Calvo (1998) coined the expression “sudden stop episodes” to designate the sharp decline in net
capital inﬂows that hit the emerging economies during the phase of capital liberalization in the 1990s. Then, and in contrast,
papers have documented the dramatic acceleration of international ﬁnancial integration due to the global saving glut
initially pointed by Bernanke (Broner et al., 2010). In sum the idea that international capital may accumulate and dis-
accumulate in waves is only recent and was put forward by Forbes and Warnock (2012), conﬁrmed by Rey (2015) who
documents a global ﬁnancial cycle in capital ﬂows for the period of 1990–2012.
Shortly after the global ﬁnancial crisis, Forbes and Warnock (2012) provided an overall picture of the massive capital
retrenchment. They put it in the perspective of a broader international capital cycle and emphasized the unprecedented
worldwide magnitude of this episode. Capital ﬂight episodes have proceeded when investors have massively repatriated
their capital back home following the Greek crisis (Al-Eyd and Berkmen, 2013). From then on, scholars have documented an
internal disintegration relying on various measures from the divergence of borrowing costs to composite indicators of
ﬁnancial integration (Schildbach, 2011; Schoenmaker, 2013; European Commission, 2014). Here, relying on data spanning
the period of rise and fall of ﬁnancial integration since 1999, we will estimate the trends in international banking integration
by zone to precisely document the evolution and draw quantitative comparisons over a long span.
What drives international capital in and out is an important question in the literature on international capital markets.
Earlier theoretical literature emphasized the role of the development of the domestic ﬁnancial system and macroeconomic
conditions in driving international capital (Levine, 1997). In contrast, Forbes and Warnock (2012) ﬁnd that global risk and
contagion are the main drivers of capital ﬂow waves while domestic conditions only play a minor role. Their result is
consistent with Rey (2015) who ﬁnds that the global ﬁnancial cycle in capital ﬂows co-moves with a measure of global risk.
While global factors and contagion effects may explain the general patterns of the ﬁnancial cycle in different countries,
domestic factors may well explain magnitude and length. In the following, we review the papers that can inform us about
the potential causes behind the patterns we will document. In particular, what drives the retrenchment of banking assets?
An obvious motivation for banks to reduce their exposure to foreign sovereign bonds is the lack of enforceability of
sovereign debt and the subsequent implicit seniority of domestic over foreign debt holders (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981).
When foreign debt holders anticipate that the government will not enforce payment to foreigners, they sell their securities
to the domestic private sector in the secondary market (Broner et al., 2010). An alternative motivation is the moral suasion
by governments and institutions consisting in forcing domestic banks to buy local assets to provide credit domestically
rather than internationally (Battistini et al., 2014). For example, Buch et al. (2013) ﬁnd that German banks which received
state support during the crisis have lowered their international assets. A third motivation to withdraw funds is speciﬁc to
currency unions due to the fact that in such institutional setting banks operate in the inter-bank market as in a domestic
context (Manna, 2011). With the possibility of breakup, they get more concerned about credit recovery procedures when
these take place in a foreign regulatory and legal jurisdiction. In sum, the loss of credibility of the single currency union
fosters banks to withdraw funds from foreign markets. Last, Adrian and Shin (2009) have documented the growing
importance of the capital market in the supply of credit in the decade 2000. In line with this evolution, Buch et al. (2013)
ﬁnd that German banks with a market-based funding model have reduced their foreign exposure more than banks with
deposit-funded model after an increase in the cost of wholesale and short-term funding.
As far as our analysis is concerned, we observe that potential mechanisms are speciﬁc by asset category (banking,
corporate non-ﬁnancial or sovereign assets) or by bank category (market versus deposit-funded). As the sectoral breakdown
differs by dyad in time in our dataset and we work with aggregated instead of individual bank data, a formal test of the
relative relevance of these explanations is not possible with publicly available data and we will explain precisely why when
we present our estimates in Section 5. Nevertheless the different arguments identiﬁed in the literature guide our empirical
investigation and interpretation.
In the following we provide an overview of international banking activities based on raw statistics in order to get a ﬁrst
picture and raise the empirical questions we will address later.
3. Overview of international banking activities
3.1. Data
We consider the evolution of the consolidated foreign claims reported by 14 countries at the BIS over the 1995–2012
period.5 Half of these reporting countries are currently in the euro area: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and
the Netherlands. The seven other reporting countries are: Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Japan,
Sweden and the United States.
The BIS publishes consolidated and locational banking statistics (Wooldridge, 2002; BIS, 2013; McGuire and Wooldridge,
2005). In this paper, we use the consolidated data because they capture the country risk exposure of banks and they
represent the broadest picture of international banking activities.6 In fact, consolidated foreign claims represent foreign
ﬁnancial claims reported by domestic bank headquarter, including the exposures of their foreign afﬁliates (i.e., branches and
subsidiaries) and netting out intragroup positions.7 These data provide a breakdown by vis-à-vis countries (also called
partner or recipient countries), a fact that will allow us to distinguish euro area and non euro area members. The foreign
claims are comprehensive: they are made up of outstanding loans, holding of securities, banks derivatives and contingent
claims on different economic sectors (banks, public sector and non-bank private sector) and on an immediate
borrower basis.
The consolidated foreign claims of the 14 reporting countries are spread out over a large number of recipient countries.
Since the end of the nineties, the number of recipient countries has been quite stable at the aggregate level around 196 from
2000 to 2012 (see Table 1). In addition, Table 1 shows that the number of vis-à-vis countries is quite similar for the subset of
euro area reporting countries and the subset of non euro area reporting countries.3.2. Global trends in the consolidated foreign claims
Before proceeding to the estimation of our measure of banking integration, we comment raw statistics in order to
get a preliminary picture. Fig. 1a represents the aggregated evolution of the consolidated foreign claims of the 14
reporting countries vis-à-vis all countries during the 1999–2012 period (solid line). The aggregated evolution is also split
between the euro area reporting countries and the non euro area reporting countries (dashed and dotted lines
respectively).8
Fig. 1a indicates a fast expansion in international banking activities from 1999 to 2007. The consolidated foreign claims
amounted 7833 billion of USD in 1999 and increased by 238% from 1999 to 2007. The euro area and the non euro area
reporting countries expanded their international banking activities in a similar extent, excepted in 2007 when the increase
was signiﬁcantly higher in the euro area reporting countries (dotted line). No doubt the Global Crisis dealt international
banking a serious blow. In 2008, the consolidated foreign claims decreased signiﬁcantly and have been stable afterwards.
However, the aggregate situation hides two opposite evolution. International banking activities reported by non euro area
countries were severely hit in 2007 but recovered quickly as the international banking activities of non euro area reporting
countries has displayed an upward trend since 2008 (dashed line). On the contrary, the banking activity of euro area
reporting countries has not recovered since the global ﬁnancial crisis and international banking activities show a downward
trend. As a result, the share reported by the euro area countries in claims vis-à-vis all countries has decreased from 51.77% in
2005 to 40.33% in 2012 (see Table 1). This decline develops inside and outside the euro area. On the one hand, their positions
represented 63.24% of the total position vis-à-vis euro area countries in 2005 and 55% in 2012. On the other hand, the euro
area reporting banks reduced their relative importance in non euro area countries too from 46.78% of the consolidated
foreign claims vis-à-vis non euro area countries in 2005 to 34.29% in 2012.3.3. The euro area as recipient area
Fig. 1b focuses on the consolidated foreign claims vis-à -vis euro area countries to highlight the situation of the euro area as
recipient area. Fig. 1b shows that the consolidated foreign claims vis-à-vis euro area countries were 2232 billion of USD in 1999
and increased by 302% from 1999 to 2007. The consolidated foreign claims vis-à-vis euro area countries represents 28.11% of
the total in 1999 and this proportion has slightly increased until 2007 (see Table 1). In sum, the dotted line in Fig. 1b illustrates5 In 1995, statistics on international banking activity were reported by 15 countries. However, we exclude Finland from the analysis because no
statistics were available by Finland over the 2004–2009 period.
6 We use the data published in Table 9B of the BIS Quarterly Review under the title “The consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks.”
7 More precisely consolidated foreign claims represent claims on non-residents of the reporting country and are calculated as the sum of cross-border
claims and local claims (in all currencies) of reporting banks' foreign afﬁliates. Foreign claims are therefore larger than international claims calculated as
the sum of cross-border claims in any currency and local claims of foreign afﬁliates denominated in non-local currencies.
8 Data are partially available from 1995 but they show a level shift in 1999 due to a change in methodology. Indeed, reporting countries started to
report claims vis-à-vis each other from 1999. Before this change in methodology, reported claims were mainly vis-à-vis developing countries and offshore
centers.
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Data source:  BIS consolidated banking statistics (Table 9B, Foreign claims by nationality of reporting banks, immediate borrower basis) 
Fig. 1. Consolidated foreign claims over the 1999–2012 period.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on consolidated foreign claims.
Year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012
Number of partners (i.e., number of vis-à-vis countries):
reported by the 14 countries 167 196 197 194 196
reported by the 7 euro area countries 160 190 194 189 190
reported by the 7 non euro area countries 149 177 187 183 188
Share reported by the7 euro area countries (in %):
in claims vis-à-vis all countries 43.59 48.85 51.77 45.14 40.33
in claims vis-à-vis euro area countries 67.66 62.14 63.24 60.10 55.00
in claims vis-à-vis non euro area countries 43.03 43.86 46.78 38.59 34.29
Share of claims vis-à-vis euro area countries in claims vis-à-vis all countries (in %):
reported by the 14 countries 2.26 27.33 30.28 30.43 29.14
reported by the 7 euro area countries 3.51 34.76 37.00 40.52 39.75
reported by the 7 non euro area countries 1.29 20.23 23.07 22.13 21.97
Coverage rate (in %) 99.74 98.32 96.78 93.52 93.28
Note: the coverage rate represents total claims reported by the 14 countries in our sample divided by total claims reported by all the countries reporting
consolidated banking statistics at the BIS.
Data source: BIS consolidated banking statistics.the unambiguous rise in banking integration in euro area over the 1999–2007 period. In turn, since 2007 the evolution has
markedly reversed with a 38% reduction of euro area banks expositions inside the zone. Given the economic and ﬁnancial
divergence between core and peripheral countries since 2010, Fig. 2 further distinguishes destination countries by stressed and
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
   0
1000
2000
3000
4000
years
C
on
so
lid
at
ed
 fo
re
ig
n 
cl
ai
m
s
(in
 b
ill
io
n 
of
 U
S 
do
lla
rs
)
Claims vis−à−vis stressed countries
Claims vis−à−vis non stressed countries
Note:  The reporting countries are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italia and the Netherland.
The stressed countries are: Greece, Ireland, Italy Portugal and Spain.
The non stressed countries are: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands.
Data source:  BIS consolidated banking statistics (Table 9B, Foreign claims by nationality of reporting
banks, immediate borrower basis)
Fig. 2. Claims reported by Euro area countries (7 countries).non-stressed economies.9 The shape is relatively similar up until 2010 after which it diverges: we observe a stabilization in the
banking activity towards core countries and a continuous decline in the banking activity towards stressed countries. This shift
in the behavior of the euro area reporting countries contrasts with the behavior of the non euro area reporting countries which
continue to expand their international banking activities vis-à-vis euro area countries (Fig. 1b).
3.4. Non euro area countries as recipient countries
Fig. 1c plots the consolidated foreign claims vis-à-vis non euro area countries. The activity by non euro area banks has
declined on a very short period in 2008 and recovered with a slope similar to the pre-crisis trend. In turn, the activity by
euro area banks has kept on declining since 2007. More precisely, the euro area banks reduced their consolidated claims in
countries outside of the euro area by 35% from 2007 to 2012. In sum, the retrenchment of euro area banks also concerns
their activity outside the euro area.
In total, raw statistics suggest an overall massive retrenchment of European banks. European countries have faced
sequential crisis episodes since 2008 and the euro area is now one of the few areas where the economy has not yet
recovered. Can the heterogeneous situation just described be entirely attributed to the economic recession in Europe?
During the previous decade, rising institutional linkages have unambiguously accelerated the ﬁnancial integration in the
euro area. Are we observing a correction after the tremendous acceleration of banking integration inside the euro area? How
does the European situation compare with the rest of the world? Aggregated data and graphical representations inform us
on raw activity only. In the following we present our empirical approach to measure banking integration.4. The gravity model
We deﬁne banking integration as the changes in international banking activities which are not driven by standard gravity
factors. It requires to identify time trends in the consolidated foreign claims by controlling for, among others, the time-
varying size of countries, the distance between countries and the ﬁnancial openness of countries. Doing so, we isolate the
“natural” factors and we can more precisely assess the evolution in the degree of integration (or disintegration) of banking
sectors. In the following, we describe our baseline and augmented speciﬁcations, our strategy to include time trends and the
estimation methodology. We draw on previous works in the gravity model literature to specify our models.
4.1. The gravity factors
4.1.1. The baseline speciﬁcation
The baseline speciﬁcation includes a narrow set of explanatory variables. More precisely, we focus only on the standard
gravity variables in the baseline speciﬁcation in order to maximize the number of observations in the estimates. The9 Stressed countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain and non stressed include Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands.
baseline speciﬁcation is given by:
ln CFCijt ¼ β1 ln Yitþβ2 ln Yjtþβ3 ln Dijþβ4Lijþβ5Legalijþβ6Contigijþβ7EIAijtþβ8EEAijtþβtþμijþεijt ; ð1Þ
where the subscripts refer to reporter country i that has banking activities in partner country j in year t. The BIS databases
provide consolidated foreign claims expressed in nominal US dollar terms. Variable CFCijt is expressed in real terms using
the US GDP deﬂator index as a deﬂator.
The real GDPs of the reporter and partner countries (Yit and Yjt) are used as economic mass variables in the gravity
speciﬁcation. These data are collected from the United Nations Statistics Division. Coefﬁcients β1 and β2 are expected to be
positive. The standard gravity variables also include a set of bilateral country variables that proxy frictions. In the baseline
speciﬁcation, we include the geographical distance (Dij) and binary variables indicating the presence of a common language
(Lij), a common legal origin (Legalij), a common border (Contigij), the signature of an Economic Integration Agreement (EIAijt)
and the European Economic Area membership (EEAijt). These variables, except EIAijt and EEAijt, come from the CEPII distance
database. In the gravity speciﬁcation, the distance is considered to be the main friction so coefﬁcient β3 is expected to be
negative. However, the effect of distance can be overestimated for neighboring countries because countries sharing a
common border have generally more relationships. Coefﬁcient β6 associated with the contiguity dummy variable is
therefore expected to be positive. Furthermore, the variables Lij, Legalij, EIAijt and EEAijt should positively affect the con-
solidated foreign claims. Indeed, the same ofﬁcial language makes international banking activities easier and a common
legal origin can ease the assessment of the institutional framework of the partner country. In addition, EIAs are made to
promote trade in services activities, including ﬁnancial services, therefore allowing a deeper exploration of the liberalization
process at the bilateral or multilateral level.10 Finally, the variable EEAijt is used to control for the speciﬁc situation in the
European Economic Area members. Indeed the harmonization of ﬁnancial services regulation is implemented at the level of
the European Economic Area, i.e. 28 UE member states, plus Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein. The variable EEAijt is a
dummy taking a value equal to 1 when the EEA agreement is in force both in countries i and j.
Finally, a time ﬁxed effect (βt) and a bilateral term (μij) are included in the speciﬁcation as control variables. The bilateral
term is included to account for the time-invariant unobserved characteristics such as the ﬁnancial center status of the dyad's
countries for example.
4.1.2. Augmented speciﬁcations
Two main limits can be pointed out in the baseline speciﬁcation. First, Eq. (1) does not control for time-varying frictions
as ﬁnancial openness. Second, the size of each country is captured only by the real GDP. This measure can be imprecise when
the gravity model is applied to a speciﬁc sector or activity. Our augmented speciﬁcations address both limitations with the
caveat that additional control variables reduces the sample size due to data availability.
The augmented speciﬁcation controls for the size of the banking sector by including the credit to GDP normalized by
year, Creditit and Creditjt for countries i and j respectively, obtained from the Global Financial Development (GFD) database of
the World Bank.11 The coefﬁcients associated with these two variables are expected to be positive because Creditit and
Creditjt act as economic mass variables.
The augmented speciﬁcation includes 3 additional variables to control for time-varying frictions. More precisely, we
include the Chinn-Ito index (Kaopenjt), the legal structure and property rights index form the Fraser Institute (Propertyjt),
and the bank concentration indicator from the GFD database of the World Bank. The Chinn-Ito index is based on the
restrictions on cross-border ﬁnancial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions. It measures the degree of capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006, 2008) and should therefore
positively affect the consolidated foreign claims. The legal structure and property rights index controls for the quality of the
legal system and the security of property right in the partner country as poor legal and property rights institutions can
impede international banking activities as lending or holding of securities. This composite index is higher when countries
have more secure property rights and when countries have legal institutions that are more supportive of the rule of law.
Therefore, the coefﬁcient associated with variable Propertyjt is expected to be positive. Finally, we control for the con-
centration in the banking sector of the partner country with the variable Concentrationjt, computed as the share of the assets
of three largest commercial banks in total commercial banking assets. If a limited number of players dominate the banking
sector in the partner country, banks from the reporting country might be impeded from entering the market. Therefore, the
coefﬁcient associated with variable Concentrationjt is expected to be negative.
The augmented speciﬁcation is given by:
ln CFCijt ¼ β1 ln Yitþβ2 ln Yjtþβ3 ln Dijþβ4Lijþβ5Legalijþβ6Contigij
þβ7EIAijtþβ8EEAijtþβ9Credititþβ10Credititþβ11Kaopenjtþβ12Propertyjt
þβ13Concentrationjtþβtþμijþεijt : ð2Þ10 The variable EIAijt is constructed by Guillin (2013b). According to WTO terminology, EIAs correspond to Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) for
services (see the RTA database, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx).
11 More precisely Creditit ¼ ðXitX :t Þ=σt where Xit is the credit to GDP ratio for country i at year t, X :t and σt are the average and the standard deviation
respectively of the credit to GDP ratio at year t computed on the whole set of countries available in the GFD database. In sum, the variable Creditit annually
ranks countries by the size of their banking sector.
4.2. Trends in international banking activities
We draw inspiration from the gravity literature to compute our measure of banking integration. In Eqs. (1) and (2), the
residuals εijt may be used to compute this measure. We rather include trends in the estimated speciﬁcations to capture the
changes in the banking integration. It boils down to identifying a trend in the unexplained part of the previous equations
without including the noise. To do we extend our speciﬁcations to include a spline function that captures a non-linear time-
trend interpreted as the banking integration. Non-linearity allows us to account for a possible reversal in the banking
integration following the global ﬁnancial crisis.
A spline function is deﬁned as a smooth polynomial function that is piece-wise-deﬁned and therefore provides a ﬂexible
tool to capture a non-linear relationship. More precisely, the spline function depends on the time trend (Tijt), marking the
number of years since the beginning of the sample (i.e., 1999), and is embodied by two variables (called Basis0 and Basis1).
These two variables are incorporated as a building-block into the gravity model instead of the time ﬁxed effect (βt).
Computational details are reported in Appendix A and a general presentation of spline functions can be found in Harrell
(2001). We rely on spline functions rather than a quadratic or a cubic time-trend because, as indicated by Harrell (2001),
“polynomials have some undesirable properties (e.g., undesirable peaks and valleys, and the ﬁt in one region of X can be greatly
affected by data in other regions) and will not adequately ﬁt many functional forms” (p. 18). More particularly, we do not want
to constraint the functional form ﬁtting the evolution of the banking integration and spline functions allow us to impose
lower restrictions on the shape of the banking integration than a quadratic or a cubic time-trend.
Furthermore, we allow the spline functions to be different for each group. We spread out the dyads in four groups
according to the membership to the euro area and we introduce a speciﬁc spline function for each group. More precisely, the
four groups are made from claims: (1) reported by euro area countries vis-à-vis euro area countries (EA-EA); (2) reported by
euro area countries vis-à-vis non euro area countries (EA-NEA); (3) reported by non euro area countries vis-à-vis euro area
countries (NEA- EAÞ; (4) reported by non euro area countries vis-à-vis non euro area countries (NEA-NEA).
The augmented speciﬁcation including spline functions is the following:
ln CFCijt ¼ β1 ln Yitþβ2 ln Yjtþβ3 ln Dijþβ4Lijþβ5Legalijþβ6Contigij
þβ7EIAijtþβ8EEAijtþβ9Credititþβ10Creditjtþβ11Kaopenjtþβ12Propertyjt
þβ13Concentrationjtþ
X4
k ¼ 1
αkBasis0
g
ijtþ
X4
k ¼ 1
α4þkBasis1
g
ijtþμijþuijt : ð3Þ
where Basis0gijt and Basis1
g
ijt are the basis variables obtained from a natural cubic spline function if the dyad ij belong to
group g and 0 otherwise. The four different groups are g¼EA-EA,EA-NEA,NEA-EA or NEA-NEA.
4.3. Estimation methodology
We consider the ﬁxed effect (FE) estimator and the Hausman and Taylor (1981) (HT) estimator to estimate the model.
Due to the panel structure of the data, the ﬁxed effect estimator can be a natural choice to estimate the model. However,
using ﬁxed effects to account for the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (μij) makes it impossible to identify the
coefﬁcients associated with the observed ﬁxed effects such as the distance variable.
Switching to the random effect (RE) estimator allows us to identify all the coefﬁcients associated with Eqs. (1)–(3) but
this estimator is generally not relevant for gravity models. This is because the RE estimator includes the time-invariant
unobserved individual effects within the error term and assumes that the unobserved individual effects and the explanatory
variables are not correlated. This hypothesis is however generally not supported by the data and leads to inconsistent
estimated coefﬁcient. We will use the Hausman (1978) test to check if the RE estimator is inconsistent.
The alternative Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator can provide a more satisfactory approach. The HT estimator is based
on several steps (including auxiliary regressions, data transformations and an instrumental variable approach) to tackle the
inconsistency generally characterizing the RE estimator.12 Furthermore, this estimator requires the partition of the explanatory
variables into exogenous and endogenous variables. The exogenous variables are assumed to be uncorrelated to the unob-
served individual effects, whilst the endogenous variables are correlated with these effects.13 Baltagi et al. (2003) and Baltagi
(2005) suggest using a Hausman test on the difference between the FE estimator and the HT estimator to validate the partition
of explanatory variables. When the partition is validated, the HT estimator preserves the consistency of the estimates char-
acterizing the FE estimator, allows us to include the observed ﬁxed effects and provides more efﬁcient estimates.
Lastly, the sample used in the estimates will be unbalanced. This characteristic can lead to a selection bias. We use the
methodology proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) as in Carrère (2006) to tackle this selection bias. Verbeek and Nijman
(1992) suggest including three variables in the estimated speciﬁcations to test and correct the selection bias: PRESij, the12 See Greene (2003) and Baltagi (2005) for a detailed presentation of the HT estimator. This estimator has been used by Carrère (2006) and McPherson
and Trumbull (2008) for gravity models estimated on goods and Walsh (2008) and Bouvatier (2014) for gravity models estimated on services.
13 The distinction between time-variant variables and time-invariant variables is also made in the implementation of the HT estimator. Time-variant
and time-invariant variables are treated differently in the four steps of the HT estimator.
number of years of presence of the country-pair ij; DDij, a dummy variable equal to one if the country-pair ij is observed in
all periods; and PAijt, a dummy variable equal to one if the country-pair ij was present in the previous period.145. Results
5.1. Estimation results
The baseline sample contains 14 reporting countries and 186 partner countries during the period 1999–2012, resulting in
an unbalanced panel data set of 22,077 observations.15 The descriptive statistics concerning the variables used in the estimates
are reported in Table 2.16 We check pairwise correlations and variance inﬂation factors and detect no multicollinearity issues.
The estimates of the baseline speciﬁcation are reported in Table 3. The model is ﬁrstly estimated without the basis
variables in columns (1) and (2) with the FE estimator and the HT estimator respectively.17 The main standard gravity factors
are signiﬁcant and with the expected sign: consolidated foreign claims positively depend on the economic size in source and
destination countries and negatively on physical distance. This is because a larger economic size implies larger banking
sectors, thus justifying the expansion of international banking activities while the distance proxies information frictions
(Portes and Rey, 2005). In addition, as expected, sharing a common language boosts the consolidated foreign claims, as well
as the membership to the European Economic Area of both source and destination countries. In turn, the common legal
origin and the contiguity dummy variable are not signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The positive effect of the existence of an
Economic Integration Agreement is more difﬁcult to identify. The coefﬁcient associated with the variable EIAijt is not sig-
niﬁcant in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 but turns signiﬁcant at the 1% or 10% level when the basis variables are included
and when the augmented speciﬁcations are considered. Finally, the high value of the Hausman statistic in column
(1) conﬁrms that the RE estimator is not appropriate while the low value of this statistics in column (2) suggests that the HT
estimator is consistent and more efﬁcient than the FE estimator.
The basis variables are included in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. Our results are remarkably stable across all speciﬁ-
cations: the estimated coefﬁcients associated with the standard gravity factors are not noticeably modiﬁed by the inclusion
of the basis variables; similarly, the estimates of the augmented speciﬁcations reported in Table 4 conﬁrm that standard
gravity factors are signiﬁcant.
Focusing precisely on the additional variables in the augmented speciﬁcation reported in Table 4, the variables Creditit
and Creditjt, included to better control for the size of the banking sectors, are ﬁrstly added in the estimates reported in
columns (1) and (2). These variables have a positive and signiﬁcant effect as expected. Note, however, that the inclusion of
these variables imply that the sample falls to 17,826 observations. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, the remaining variables
are added to the estimated speciﬁcation and the sample falls to 14,258 observations.18 Higher ﬁnancial openness in the
partner country (proxied by the variable Kaopenjt) positively and signiﬁcantly affects consolidated foreign claims. In addi-
tion, the positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient associated with variables Propertyjt indicates that consolidated foreign claims are
higher if the partner country has more secure property rights and legal institutions that are more supportive of the rule of
law. Finally, the degree of concentration in the banking sector of the partner country impedes consolidated foreign claims as
suggested by the negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient associated with variable Concentrationjt.
Given the stability of the estimates across the different speciﬁcations, we are conﬁdent with our measure of international
banking integration. Recall that it is captured by the basis variables obtained from a spline function and included in the
speciﬁcations. In order to draw international comparisons and document speciﬁc patterns to the euro area, we distinguish four
different groups. First important remark: the basis variables are overall signiﬁcant after controlling for gravity factors (see
Tables 3 and 4), a fact that suggests that banking integration has signiﬁcantly changed during the period. Second important
result: the coefﬁcients associated with variables Basis0gijt and Basis1
g
ijt are quite different across groups and can even have
opposite signs. This suggests that the evolution of the international banking activities has different pattern depending on the
groups. However, it is difﬁcult to interpret the value of the coefﬁcients associated with spline functions. In order to get an
accurate picture of banking integration and draw comparisons across regions, we plot the trends ﬁtted by the basis variables.14 Variable PAijt is set to zero for the ﬁrst year of the sample.
15 To make sure that estimations do not account for partner countries rarely observed, we restrict the sample to countries with at least 10 observations,
hence 186 instead of 196 partners as in the initial data set.
16 The group EA-EA represents 5.41% of the full sample (i.e., 1,194 observations), EA-NEA, 49.63% (i.e., 10,957 observations), NEA-EA, 5.61% (i.e., 1,238
observations) and NEA-NEA 39.35% (i.e., 8,688 observations).
17 In the baseline speciﬁcation, the variables ln Yit and ln Yjt are considered as endogenous when the HT estimator is implemented. We use the LR test
(Baltagi et al., 2003) to choose the partition of the explanatory variables.
18 In the augmented speciﬁcation, the variables ln Yjt , Creditit , Creditjt and Concentrationjt are considered as endogenous when the HT estimator is
implemented. We use the LR test (Baltagi et al., 2003) to choose the partition of the explanatory variables.
Table 3
Baseline speciﬁcation.
Estimator: ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
FE HT FE HT
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
ln Yit 1.1025
n (0.5672) 0.9190nnn (0.2489) 0.8599nn (0.4376) 1.0162nnn (0.2077)
ln Yjt 0.9982
nnn (0.1327) 1.0033nnn (0.1146) 1.3346nnn (0.1377) 1.3008nnn (0.1122)
ln Dij 0.4318nnn (0.1093) 0.4091nnn (0.1055)
Languageij 1.1879nnn (0.1854) 1.5082nnn (0.1953)
Legalij 0.0105 (0.1117) 0.0041 (0.1164)
Contigij 0.3483 (0.3392) 0.3408 (0.3537)
EIAijt 0.1404 (0.1113) 0.1453 (0.1081) 0.2911nnn (0.1125) 0.2894nnn (0.1100)
EEAijt 0.8978nnn (0.1119) 0.9031nnn (0.1085) 0.9737nnn (0.1110) 0.9565nnn (0.1080)
Basis0EAEAijt 0.0571 (0.0474) 0.0524 (0.0425)
Basis1EAEAijt 0.2521
nnn (0.0265) 0.2495nnn (0.0259)
Basis0EANEAijt 0.1911
nnn (0.0368) 0.1942nnn (0.0303)
Basis1EANEAijt 0.0622
nnn (0.0147) 0.0602nnn (0.0137)
Basis0NEAEAijt 0.1740
nnn (0.0438) 0.1660nnn (0.0367)
Basis1NEAEAijt 0.1247
nnn (0.0251) 0.1222nnn (0.0243)
Basis0NEANEAijt 0.0842
nn (0.0397) 0.0772nnn (0.0299)
Basis1NEANEAijt 0.0262 (0.0163) 0.0285
n (0.0149)
Hausman statistic [p-value]:
FE vs RE 104.41 [0.0000] 210.92 [0.0000]
FE vs HT 4.61 [0.9973] 4.91 [0.9354]
Radj
2
0.5016 0.5153
R2within 0.1342 0.1426
No. Obs. 22,077 22,077 22,077 22,077
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the bilateral country-pair level and reported in brackets. The variables PRESij, DDij and PAijt, controlling for the
selection bias, are considered when the HT estimator is used. Time dummies are included in the estimates when no trend variables are considered in the
estimates (i.e., in columns (1) and (2)).
nnn Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 1% levels.
nn Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 5% levels.
n Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 10% levels.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics on the variables used in the estimates.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln CFCijt 22077 5.53 3.16 0.13 13.95
ln Yit 22,077 27.87 1.13 26.19 30.28
ln Yjt 22,077 24.52 2.15 16.86 30.28
ln Dij 22,077 8.40 0.93 4.09 9.88
Languageij 22,077 0.14 0.34 0 1
Legalij 22,077 0.24 0.43 0 1
Contigij 22,077 0.03 0.17 0 1
EIAijt 22,077 0.10 0.29 0 1
EEAijt 22,077 0.13 0.34 0 1
Creditit 17,826 1.87 0.86 0.14 4.65
Creditjt 17,826 0.27 1.13 1.12 4.72
Kaopenjt 14,258 0.82 1.56 1.88 2.38
Propertyjt 14258 5.91 1.70 1.60 9.60
Concentrationjt 14258 68.67 19.07 21.40 1005.2. Graphical analysis
The estimated trends with the augmented speciﬁcation (Eq. (3)) are plotted in Fig. 3.19 Before commenting the evolution
of banking integration in the different groups, it is worth observing that all trends implying the euro area as recipient or
source countries are downward sloping after the crisis (Fig. 3(a–c) contrary to the trend in the rest of the world (Fig. 3d).19 The estimated trends with the baseline speciﬁcation lead to similar graphical analysis. Graphs are available upon request.
Table 4
Augmented speciﬁcation.
Estimator: ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
FE HT FE HT
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
ln Yit 0.5416 (0.4815) 0.6676
nnn (0.0884) 0.4645 (0.5200) 0.6885nnn (0.0695)
ln Yjt 1.7015
nnn (0.1611) 1.5603nnn (0.1248) 1.4867nnn (0.1849) 1.2338nnn (0.0871)
ln Dij 0.2350nnn (0.0819) 0.4258nnn (0.0627)
Languageij 1.7171nnn (0.2188) 1.1363nnn (0.1671)
Legalij 0.1306 (0.1242) 0.3121nnn (0.1109)
Contigij 0.8922nn (0.4032) 0.5020 (0.3053)
EIAijt 0.2911nnn (0.1110) 0.2836nnn (0.1094) 0.2297n (0.1243) 0.2210n (0.1210)
EEAijt 0.7787nnn (0.1100) 0.7531nnn (0.1078) 0.6511nnn (0.1135) 0.6400nnn (0.1099)
Creditit 0.1371nnn (0.0365) 0.1334nnn (0.0360) 0.1544nnn (0.0383) 0.1454nnn (0.0378)
Creditjt 0.3690nnn (0.0395) 0.3647nnn (0.0391) 0.3537nnn (0.0482) 0.3406nnn (0.0457)
Kaopenjt 0.1249nnn (0.0286) 0.1186nnn (0.0266)
Propertyjt 0.0446n (0.0256) 0.0479n (0.0248)
Concentrationjt 0.0035nn (0.0014) 0.0038nnn (0.0014)
Basis0EAEAijt 0.0543 (0.0507) 0.0482 (0.0452) 0.0066 (0.0459) 0.0028 (0.0542)
Basis1EAEAijt 0.2539
nnn (0.0260) 0.2548nnn (0.0252) 0.2846nnn (0.0280) 0.2822nnn (0.0288)
Basis0EANEAijt 0.2286
nnn (0.0402) 0.2090nnn (0.0334) 0.1788nnn (0.0323) 0.2098nnn (0.0452)
Basis1EANEAijt 0.0693
nnn (0.0163) 0.0690nnn (0.0153) 0.0934nnn (0.0169) 0.0948nnn (0.0182)
Basis0NEAEAijt 0.1194
nnn (0.0432) 0.1238nnn (0.0331) 0.1584nnn (0.0343) 0.1520nnn (0.0474)
Basis1NEAEAijt 0.0863
nnn (0.0312) 0.0870nnn (0.0305) 0.1176nnn (0.0324) 0.1154nnn (0.0334)
Basis0NEANEAijt 0.1089
nn (0.0443) 0.1245nnn (0.0338) 0.1927nnn (0.0293) 0.1689nnn (0.0476)
Basis1NEANEAijt 0.0589
nnn (0.0173) 0.0613nnn (0.0159) 0.0479nnn (0.0159) 0.0437nn (0.0176)
Hausman statistic [p-value]:
FE vs RE 255.24 [0.0000] 145.19 [0.0000]
FE vs HT 17.00 [0.1495] 16.09 [0.3079]
R2adj 0.5941 0.6246
R2within 0.1877 0.2060
No. Obs. 17,826 17,826 14,258 14,258
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the bilateral country-pair level and reported in brackets. The variables PRESij, DDij and PAijt, controlling for the
selection bias, are considered when the HT estimator is used.
nnn Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 1% levels.
nn Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 5% levels.
n Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 10% levels.First, before the crisis, the euro area was the most attractive destination. In fact, the trends of claims towards the euro
area (Fig. 3a and c) are signiﬁcantly steeper than the trends towards the rest of the world (Fig. 3b and d). The exposure of
foreign banks in the euro area countries have increased by more than what size and friction factors imply during the pre-
crisis period. In sum, after the enforcement of the monetary union in 1999, we do not only observe that the banking
integration inside the euro area has boosted but also that the attractiveness of the euro area's for the other reporting
countries has accelerated.20 It is interesting to note that descriptive statistics are misleading as they show a much more
balanced picture: the share of claims vis-à-vis euro area to claims vis-à-vis all the world has increased from 27.33% to 30.28%
only between 1999 and 2005 (see Table 1).
Since the crisis, it is striking that the beneﬁts have been entirely lost inside the monetary union (Fig. 3a), a result that
puts in historical perspective the marked fragmentation of the euro area documented by previous scholars cited in the
Literature section. In turn, the trend in banking activities from non euro area reporting countries towards euro area have
slowed down but the decline is much less sizable (Fig. 3b).
If we now turn to the foreign bank exposure to non euro area countries, the trends of our 14 developed reporting countries
are parallel between 1999 and 2004 and diverge afterwards (Fig. 3b and d). From 2006, a gap emerges between euro area and
non euro area reporting countries that keeps widening onward: we ﬁnd a massive retrenchment by euro area banks on the
one hand and a growing integration of non euro area countries on the other hand. In sum, our estimates suggest that non euro
area banks have taken advantage of the euro area banks' retrenchment and gained international market shares.
In total, the forward march of banking integration has reversed only as far as euro area countries are concerned, as
recipient or source countries. The banking integration of euro area has unambiguously been cyclical since the single20 This is consistent with the positive inﬂuence of euro on the attractiveness of euro assets due to lower transaction costs documented in Coeurdacier
and Martin (2009).
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Fig. 3. Trends in international banking activities.currency was launched. In the rest of the world, the decline of international banking activity in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial
crisis was entirely due to temporary frictions. Now, we would like to assess the magnitude of these patterns and compare
their evolution with a benchmark, i.e. the level of foreign claims justiﬁed by gravity factors. To do so, we proceed to an
overshooting analysis.
5.3. Overshooting analysis
We measure the deviations from the benchmark level to quantify the magnitude of the contraction in Europe and the
forward march of banking integration in the rest of the world. From a methodological perspective, it requires to compute the
ﬁtted value of consolidated foreign claims (i.e. forecasting them with our estimated model) and assess the contribution of
time trends. We compute an overshooting measure at the group level (see Appendix A for the precise methodology). The
overshooting measures obtained from the augmented speciﬁcation are plotted in Fig. 4.21
It is striking that the banking integration inside the euro area (Fig. 4a) has experienced the strongest and fastest growth
across the four groups during the ﬁrst half of the decade 2000. In fact, consolidated foreign claims with euro area as a source
and destination were 41% below their benchmark level in 1999, a level that they have caught up in four years only and
greatly exceeded: in 2006, the euro area banks' exposure to the Eurozone was 37% higher than the level justiﬁed by the
benchmark. In comparison, the exposure of non euro area reporting banks to the Eurozone was 32% below their benchmark
level in 1999 and has increased slightly more progressively: at the peak in 2006–2007, it was 17% above what standard
gravity factors would imply (Fig. 4c).
The larger the peak, the larger the trough. On the one hand, intra euro area banking activities were 37% below the
benchmark level in 2012. It means that the economic downturn faced by the euro area since 2008 is far from being sufﬁcient
to account for the decline of international banking activities between euro area members. On the other hand, in 2012, foreign21 The overshooting measures obtained with the baseline speciﬁcation lead to similar conclusions. Graphs are available upon request.
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Note: The overshooting at the group level is defined in Appendix B. The grey area corresponds to the one−standard error band.
The standard error for a given group in a given year is computed from the overshooting measures of the dyads belonging to
this group.
Fig. 4. Overshooting in international banking activities.claims from non euro area banks with destination the euro area were at the benchmark level (the undershooting is 1% in
2012). In the following section, we will further examine the speciﬁc situation of core and peripheral recipient countries.
Now, considering the consolidated foreign claims from the euro area to the rest of the world reported in Fig. 4b, we
observe that the presence of euro area banks was relatively strong in 1999, almost 13% above what size and friction factors
imply. Then, euro area banks have mildly reduced their activities outside the area (probably in the beneﬁt of inside the area)
but they were still above the benchmark level in 2006. Then, we measure a sharp decline reaching 33% below its benchmark
level in 2012. It is worth noting that their retrenchment inside and outside the euro area are comparable.22 Given that we
observe one cycle only in the euro area, i.e. no systematic cyclical pattern on a longer span, it is difﬁcult to make a clear
conclusion on the future evolution. We can only assume that, in the future, international banking activities in the euro area
will increase to catch up their benchmark level (bearing in mind that this level may have decreased in the meanwhile).
Last, the pattern is strikingly different outside the euro area: while the level of banking integration was 13% below the
benchmark level during the ﬁrst half of the decade 2000 and it got closed to the benchmark level in 2006, it has ﬁnally
exceeded it by 40% since then. In sum, banking integration has never declined and, on the contrary, the trend is steeper after
the crisis. On a longer period, would the model give regular periods of overshooting and then undershooting? We leave the
question open to future investigation with longer time series.
In order to grasp a more exhaustive picture, it is essential to take into account heterogeneity inside the euro area;
similarly it is safe to distinguish advanced and emerging countries outside the euro area. It is the focus of the next section.22 In order to gain more insight of what is driving the peculiarity of euro area, it would be interesting to repeat the analysis with disaggregated data to
distinguish claims to the government, ﬁnancial and private non-ﬁnancial sector. Unfortunately these data are not publicly available at the bilateral level.
5.4. Focus on core/periphery and advanced/emerging countries
We break down the euro area partner countries by stressed/non stressed countries and the non euro area partner
countries by level of income.
To do so, when partner countries are euro area members we intereact the basis variables with the dummy variable
Dj
Stressed
taking a value equal to 1 when the country j is a stressed euro area country (i.e., Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain). Therefore, the intereaction variables capture whether the shape of the trends differ when the partner country is a
stressed euro area country. The estimates obtained with the FE and HT estimators are reported in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 5, respectively. Only one of the interaction variable does not have a signiﬁcant effect at the 10% level, implying that the
shape of the estimated trends signiﬁcantly differs between stressed and non stressed countries.
Fig. 5 which plots the overshooting analysis associated with the new estimate provides two important results: ﬁrst inside
the euro area, stressed countries have experienced more pronounced evolution from the beginning of the period. TheTable 5
Subgroups analyses: stressed countries and income levels.
Estimator: ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
FE HT FE HT
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
ln Yit 0.5015 (0.5168) 0.6905
nnn (0.0682) 0.3889 (0.5139) 0.7570nnn (0.0866)
ln Yjt 1.4379
nnn (0.1858) 1.2194nnn (0.0874) 1.7496nnn (0.1949) 1.4618nnn (0.1255)
ln Dij 0.4495nnn (0.0619) 0.5018nnn (0.0749)
Languageij 1.0977
nnn (0.1650) 1.2658nnn (0.1895)
Legalij 0.3376
nnn (0.1113) 0.3095nn (0.1206)
Contigij 0.4726 (0.3053) 0.8371nn (0.3661)
EIAijt 0.2252n (0.1239) 0.2190n (0.1205) 0.1461 (0.1209) 0.1444 (0.1181)
EEAijt 0.6212
nnn (0.1135) 0.6111nnn (0.1097) 0.5038nnn (0.1160) 0.5045nnn (0.1128)
Creditit 0.1527
nnn (0.0382) 0.1443nnn (0.0378) 0.1560nnn (0.0376) 0.1442nnn (0.0369)
Creditjt 0.3894
nnn (0.0517) 0.3792nnn (0.0485) 0.3419nnn (0.0487) 0.3308nnn (0.0477)
Kaopenjt 0.1225
nnn (0.0286) 0.1167nnn (0.0264) 0.1188nnn (0.0281) 0.1156nnn (0.0267)
Propertyjt 0.0464
n (0.0256) 0.0476n (0.0248) 0.0638nn (0.0251) 0.0661nnn (0.0244)
Concentrationjt 0.0035nn (0.0014) 0.0038nnn (0.0014) 0.0044nnn (0.0014) 0.0046nnn (0.0014)
Basis0EAEAijt 0.0735 (0.0653) 0.0837 (0.0588) 0.0028 (0.0542) 0.0008 (0.0470)
Basis1EAEAijt 0.2316
nnn (0.0299) 0.2304nnn (0.0289) 0.2768nnn (0.0286) 0.2780nnn (0.0279)
Basis0EANEAijt 0.2021
nnn (0.0453) 0.1750nnn (0.0324) 0.3267nnn (0.0528) 0.2934nnn (0.0421)
Basis1EANEAijt 0.0956
nnn (0.0182) 0.0945nnn (0.0169) 0.0501nn (0.0211) 0.0456nn (0.0199)
Basis0NEAEAijt 0.2174
nnn (0.0508) 0.2214nnn (0.0398) 0.1503nnn (0.0474) 0.1491nnn (0.0354)
Basis1NEAEAijt 0.0915
nn (0.0373) 0.0901nn (0.0365) 0.1119nnn (0.0331) 0.1130nnn (0.0323)
Basis0NEANEAijt 0.1752
nnn (0.0476) 0.1958nnn (0.0294) 0.1193nn (0.0562) 0.1417nnn (0.0419)
Basis1NEANEAijt 0.0437
nn (0.0175) 0.0477nnn (0.0159) 0.0446nn (0.0215) 0.0513nn (0.0202)
Basis0EAEAijt DStressedj 0.2107
nn (0.0865) 0.2176nn (0.0862)
Basis1EAEAijt DStressedj 0.1380
nn (0.0580) 0.1466nn (0.0583)
Basis0NEAEAijt DStressedj 0.1848
nnn (0.0662) 0.1829nnn (0.0659)
Basis1NEAEAijt DStressedj 0.0746 (0.0631) 0.0817 (0.0634)
Basis0EANEAijt DHighj 0.2623
nnn (0.0556) 0.2462nnn (0.0544)
Basis1EANEAijt DHighj 0.1241
nnn (0.0353) 0.1288nnn (0.0353)
Basis0NEANEAijt DHighj 0.0406 (0.0470) 0.0311 (0.0456)
Basis1NEANEAijt DHighj 0.0090 (0.0323) 0.0123 (0.0321)
Hausman statistic [p-value]:
FE vs RE 150.72 [0.0000] 196.41 [0.0000]
FE vs HT 13.34 [0.7709] 24.58 [0.1369]
R2adj 0.6290 0.6098
R2within 0.2081 0.2167
No. Obs. 14,258 14,258 14,258 14,258
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the bilateral country-pair level and reported in brackets. The variables PRESij, DDij and PAijt, controlling for the
selection bias, are considered when the HT estimator is used. The variables Dj
Stressed
and Dj
High
are included in the estimated speciﬁcations but not reported
to save space.
nnn Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 1% levels.
nn Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 5% levels.
n Indicate signiﬁcance respectively at the 10% levels.
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Note: The overshooting at the group level is defined in Appendix B. The grey area corresponds to the one−standard error band.
The standard error for a given group in a given year is computed from the overshooting measures of the dyads belonging to
this group.
Fig. 5. Overshooting with the distinction between stressed and non stressed Euro area countries.overshooting of stressed countries is estimated at 54% above the benchmark in 2006 versus 28% for non stressed countries.
After the crisis, the decline mirrors the boomwith a level of banking activity at 56% below the benchmark level versus 24%
for non stressed euro area members. In sum stressed euro area countries have experienced a stronger ﬁnancial cycle than
the rest of the area. Second, the activity of non euro area countries with their euro area partners has mostly diverged after
the crisis. The activity towards non stressed and stressed countries was similarly at 17% above the benchmark level before
the crisis. Then, the exposure to non stressed countries has remained steady 17% above the benchmark level; in turn, the
exposure to stressed countries was 26% below the benchmark level in 2012. In sum, the withdrawal of euro area assets is
heterogenous and entirely driven by the withdrawal from stressed countries assets. The international banking activity
towards stressed euro area countries has experienced a complete cycle over the period with signiﬁcantly more marked
evolutions inside the euro area.
Second, we interact the basis variables when partner countries are non euro area members with the dummy variable
Dj
High
taking a value equal to 1 when the country j is classiﬁed as high income country in the World Bank's classiﬁcation. The
interaction variables capture whether the shape of the trends differs when the partner country is a high income country. The
estimates obtained with the FE and HT estimators are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5, respectively. The inter-
action variables are not signiﬁcant at the 10% level for non euro area reporting countries. It means that the level of income
does not affect the trend outside the euro area. Conversely, the interaction variables are signiﬁcant at the 1% level for euro
area reporting countries. Therefore the trend between euro area reporting countries and non euro area partner country
depends on the level of income. In order to explicitly represent these differences, we plot the overshooting analysis on Fig. 6.
We observe that the difference only matters at the beginning of the sample. In 1999, euro area reporting countries were
weakly integrated with high income non euro area countries while they were in an overshooting situation with non-
advanced partner countries. After the crisis, the level of income stops mattering and the trends converge.
In total, we show that the amplitude of the cycle in the euro area has been signiﬁcantly larger for stressed countries, i.e.
the larger the peak, the larger the trough. In turn, for the rest of the world, the differences of income only matters before
2006. Furthermore, outside the euro area, the banking integration has been a tenacious long-run trend whatever the level of
income. The uncovered dynamics echo the waves in international capital ﬂows described in Forbes and Warnock (2012). We
add that the waves differ signiﬁcantly across regions while Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Rey (2015) have emphasized
that the primary factor associated with capital ﬂow episodes is changes in global risk and not domestic conditions. We
assume that the difference may arise from a different resilience to global factors by zone, an explanation still consistent with
the global factor story.
Last but not least, explaining these patterns is unfortunately beyond the scope of our dataset. For example, to assess the
effect of rising sovereign risk on the exposure to foreign sovereign bonds as suggested in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), one
needs both to know the exposure to foreign sovereign bonds by dyad and to have a proxy for sovereign risk of the partner
country such as individual sovereign credit default swap. With the aggregate sectoral exposure only (i.e. aggregating
banking, corporate non-ﬁnancial or sovereign), one cannot properly assess the marginal effect of sovereign risks on the
exposure to foreign sovereign bonds because the share of sovereign claims in the aggregate sectoral exposure is unknown
and varies across dyads. So the estimated marginal effect of sovereign risk upon consolidated foreign claims would not be
informative and artiﬁcially driven by the unknown breakdown. In sum, we need data of the exposure on a sectoral basis to
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Fig. 6. Overshooting with the distinction between high income and non high income vis-à-vis countries.explicitly test the relative relevance of these explanations. Unfortunately they are not publicly available at the dyad level.
Before concluding, we present several tests to conﬁrm the robustness of our results.
5.5. Robustness checks
The stability of our results has been evaluated with several alternative speciﬁcations of the empirical model. For the sake
of space, all estimates and corresponding graphs are available upon request in an unpublished appendix.
5.5.1. Alternative augmented speciﬁcations
We report the estimates of the baseline speciﬁcation and the estimates of an augmented speciﬁcation in the main body
of the paper but much more alternative speciﬁcations could have been used.
Banking crises:
In a preliminary work, we considered the inclusion of dummies to control for banking crisis periods relying on the
Laeven and Valencia (2012) database. These additional variables do not alter our conclusions.
Proxies for the size:
We tested several variables to better control for size. First, we included stock market capitalization as a share of GDP to
better control the size; ﬁrst the variable is not signiﬁcant and second the lower availability of stock market capitalization
data reduces the sample size. Second, we included Creditit to control better for the size of the source country. The results
reported in Table 4 show that the GDP variable of the source country (ln Yit) turns non-signiﬁcant when the augmented
speciﬁcation is estimated with the FE estimator.23 The smaller sample used to estimate the augmented speciﬁcation and the
variable Creditit can both explain that the variable ln Yit turns non signiﬁcant. To disentangle these two explanations, we
have estimated the augmented speciﬁcation without the variable Creditit. The results show that the variable ln Yit remains
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Consequently, the smaller sample used to estimate the augmented speciﬁcation does not impact
our results and the size effect is properly captured by the variable Creditit .
Third, we augment our speciﬁcation with domestic bank assets in the reporting and destination countries in absolute terms.
The variables are signiﬁcant and positive as in the previous estimates including the variable credit-to-GDP (normalized by year).
The corresponding overshooting graph looks similar to our core estimates with more pronounced evolutions in some cases.
Stronger asymmetries after 2006:
We allowed the estimated coefﬁcient associated with distance to vary after 2006 in order to account for stronger
asymmetries. Indeed the value of the coefﬁcient increases in absolute terms (becomes more negative) after 2006. The
overshooting quantitative analysis changes accordingly but our conclusions remain similar.
Dummy variable for euro area membership:23 The variable ln Yit remains signiﬁcant at the 1% level when the HT estimator is used. Indeed, the Hausman test reported in Table 4 indicate that the
HT estimator is consistent and more efﬁcient than the FE estimator.
The euro area members may beneﬁt differently from the EEA harmonization. Therefore in a robustness check, we include
an additional dummy variable Euroijt taking a value equal to 1 when the dyad i and j are both euro area members. The
coefﬁcient associated with the variable Euroijt is not signiﬁcant at the 10% level suggesting that being an euro area member
does not bring extra banking activity on average in comparison with being an EEA member, all things being equal.
Initial conditions:
It is likely that the evolution through time depends on the original degree of cross-country integration. In order to control for
initial conditions, we include the bilateral amount of consolidated foreign claims in 1999 and start our estimate in 2000 (data are
not available for partners before 1999). The effect of this time-invariant variable can only be identiﬁed with the HT estimator. It is
not signiﬁcant. However, it does not mean that initial conditions do not matter in the evolution of trends across groups. In fact,
our trends are not constrained to start at the same level and it is clear on Fig. 3 that trends start at different levels across groups.
Multilateral resistance factors:
Not just bilateral, but also multilateral resistance factors, the barriers that each country faces with the rest of the world,
may affect the foreign claims. The multilateral resistance terms are not directly observable. We follow Carrère (2006) to
compute the “remoteness” variable and include it in the augmented speciﬁcation. The coefﬁcient associated with this
variable is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level with the HT estimator and non signiﬁcant at the 10% level with the FE
estimator. Results are similar and our conclusions remain.
Exchange rate effects:
McGuire and Wooldridge (2005, p. 81) point to the fact that exchange rate variation can affect reported positions of
consolidated foreign claims. In order to adjust for exchange rate movements, we augment our speciﬁcation with the log of
bilateral real exchange rate vis-a-vis the US dollar of each reporting country and partner countries. An increase corresponds
to an appreciation of the currency of country i or j, hence a depreciation of the US dollar. We expect positive signs for these
variables. Both variables are signiﬁcant and positive which conﬁrms the overestimation of the bilateral banking activity
when the US dollar depreciates. Results are similar and our conclusions remain.5.5.2. Functional form of the time trends
In order to minimize the prior on the shape of the time-trend, we use a spline function that provides ﬂexibility to capture a non-
linear relationship. A posteriori, given the shape of the estimated trends on Fig. 3, quadratic functions may also have ﬁtted these
evolutions. So to check the stability of our results, we run estimates using quadratic time-trends which lead to similar conclusions.5.5.3. Choice of the benchmark in the overshooting analysis
Last, the overshooting evaluation requires several methodological choices, in particular concerning the deﬁnition of the
benchmark level (see Appendix B). In the main body of the paper, the model is re-estimated without the trend variables to
compute the benchmark levels. For robustness check, we also considered as benchmark the ﬁtted values of the dependent
variable when all the coefﬁcients associated with trend variables (i.e., the αk in Eq. (3)) are shut down to 0. This approach
does not require to re-estimate the model and provides similar conclusions concerning the overshooting evaluation.6. Conclusion
We assess the evolution of international banking activity at the light of gravity equations which allow us to control for
standard determinants in order to draw international banking (dis)integration trends. Our estimates on a panel of 14 reporting
countries and their 186 partners during the period between 1999 and 2012 uncover several important stylized facts.
First, banking activity towards the euro area has been cyclical since 1999 with a peak in 2006 before the global ﬁnancial
crisis (37% above the benchmark) and a severe decline after the crisis. The decline is not only a correction of the overshooting
but it is also followed by an undershooting estimated at 37% below the benchmark level, which corresponds to a marked
disintegration. We ﬁnd a larger amplitude of the cycle in stressed countries than on average. In addition, euro area banks have
reduced their international exposure inside and outside the euro area to a similar extent no matter the level of income. Second,
the forward march of banking integration has reversed only as far as euro area countries are concerned as source or desti-
nation countries. In the rest of the world, the decline of international banking activity in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis
was entirely due to temporary frictions. As a consequence we ﬁnd no banking disintegration between non euro area countries.
Third, the differences of income only matter for the banking activity from the euro area towards the rest of the world and only
before 2006. Outside the euro area, the banking integration has been a tenacious long-run trend whatever the level of income.
These results hopefully call for future investigations that go beyond the scope of our dataset. First, the simultaneity of the
European retrenchment and of the expansion of international banking activities of non-euro area members raises the
question of a transfer of international banking activities from the euro area to non-euro area countries. Testing this transfer
hypothesis would require to gather and examine the data of non euro area banks market shares after 2007. Second, it would
be interesting to disentangle the different channels leading to the retrenchment of euro area banks. To explore such
channels, one would need bank-level and disaggregated data distinguishing claims by sectoral exposure.
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A restricted cubic spline (also referred to as a natural cubic spline) is deﬁned as a smooth polynomial function that is
piece-wise-deﬁned. This function depends on the time trend (T) marking the number of years since the beginning of the
sample in 1999 (with T ¼ 1;2;…;14). The places where the polynomial pieces connect are referred to as knots and allow one
to introduce changes in the relationship between the endogenous variable and the time trend (T).
Considering nþ2 knots at kminok1o⋯oknokmax, an unrestricted cubic spline function is written as follows (Royston
and Sauerbrei, 2007)24:
SðTÞ ¼ β00þβ10Tþβ20T2þβ30T3þ
Xn
j ¼ 1
βj Tkj
 3
þ þβkmin Tkminð Þ
3
þ þβkmax Tkmaxð Þ
3
þ
where the plus function Tkð Þþ is deﬁned as
Tkð Þþ ¼
Tk if TZk
0 otherwise

The terminology “restricted cubic spline” (or natural cubic spline) refers to the constraints imposed on SðTÞ, which imply
linearity beyond the boundary knots (kmin and kmaxÞ.25 This requirement tends to avoid wild behavior near the extremes
values of the data. Then, the restricted cubic spline function is written as (see Royston and Parmar, 2002 (p. 2194) for the
algebraic details):
SðTÞ ¼ γ0þγ1Basis0þγ2Basis1þ⋯þγnþ1Basisn
with γ0 ¼ β00, γ1 ¼ β10, γjþ1 ¼ βj for j¼ 1;…;n and
Basis0 ¼ T
Basisj ¼ Tkj
 3
þ λj Tkminð Þ
3
þ ð1λjÞ Tkmaxð Þ3þ for j¼ 1;…;n
with λj ¼
kmaxkj
kmaxkmin
.
Then, the basis variables ðBasis0;…;BasisnÞ can be added to the regressors in the gravity model to capture a non-linear
time-trends that embody the evolution in the banking integration. However, the basis variables have been orthogonalized
before being included in the estimated speciﬁcation, as suggested by Royston and Sauerbrei (2007). Without any trans-
formation, the basis variables are highly correlated.
The main issue related to restricted cubic splines concerns the choice of the number of knots and their locations. Harrell
(2001) recommends placing knots at equally spaced percentiles of the duration variable. In applied use, the number of knots
generally varies between three and seven. We use three knots (from which two basis variables are obtained) because the
sample covers a limited number of years (i.e. 14 years). When three knots are considered, the default percentiles provided by
Harrell (2001) are 10%, 50% and 90%. The lower and higher knots are then placed near the extreme values, and the remaining
knots are placed so that the proportion of observations between the knots is constant.Appendix B. Overshooting measure
The overshooting measure at the group level is computed in four steps.
First, we compute the ﬁtted values of the dependent variable (deﬁned as dln CFCijt) and the ﬁtted values of the dependent
variable when the model is re-estimated without the trend variables (deﬁned as dln CFCijt).26 The variables dln CFCijt anddln CFC ijt correspond to predictions of the logarithm of the consolidated foreign claims.
Second, we face a re-transformation problem because we are interested in the ﬁtted values of the level of the con-
solidated foreign claims rather than their logarithm. Taking the exponential of dln CFCijt and dln CFC ijt is incorrect because the
24 kmin and kmax are the boundary knots and will not be placed at the extremes of T, as suggested by Harrell (2001).
25 For example, the linearity constraint below kmin (i.e. when Tokmin) requires that quadratic and cubic terms must vanish, and hence, β20 ¼ β30 ¼ 0.
26 The ﬁtted values of the dependent variable when all the coefﬁcients associated with trend variables (i.e., the αk in Eq. (3)) are shut down to 0 have
also been considered to compute dln CFC ijt . This alternative approach to compute dln CFC ijt leads to similar conclusions.
error term (εijt) does not vanish in the re-transformation procedure (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p. 103). We follow Duan
(1983), and assuming that εijt is independent and identically distributed, we compute the ﬁtted values of the consolidated
foreign claims as:
dCFC ijt ¼ exp dln CFC ijt : expðεijtÞ;
dCFC ijt ¼ exp dln CFC ijt : expðεijtÞ;
where expðεijtÞ is the sample average of the exponential transformation of the error terms.
Third, we deﬁne the overshooting at the dyad level as:
OSijt ¼
dCFCijtdCFC ijtdCFCijt :
The denominator dCFCijt corresponds to the level of consolidated foreign claims justiﬁed by the gravity factors (i.e. the
benchmark level) and the numerator measures the gap from the benchmark due to the trend variables.
Last, we compute the overshooting at the group level because trend variables are deﬁned at the group level. Considering
only the dyads belonging to group g, we compute the overshooting measure for this group as a weighted average:
OSðgÞt ¼
ln CFCijtP
ij ln CFCijt
X
ij
OSijt ;
where g¼EA-EA, EA-NEA, NEA-EA or NEA-NEA.Appendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this paper can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euro
ecorev.2015.10.004.References
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